NOTES
ENTRAPMENT AND DENIAL OF THE CRIME:
A DEFENSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY
RULE
Although litigants in civil proceedings are permitted to argue inconsistent positions,' most federal courts have not allowed inconsistent defenses in criminal cases. 2 Concern over this so-called "inconsistency
rule" in criminal cases most frequently arises with respect to the entrapment defense. Currently, the federal courts of appeals are split on the
question whether a criminal defendant who wants to plead entrapment
may also assert other defenses. 3 The Supreme Court has declined to re4
solve the issue.
After a brief discussion of the development of the entrapment defense, this note outlines the four approaches that the federal courts of
appeals have taken in addressing whether a criminal defendant may assert inconsistent defenses in an entrapment case.5 The note advocates
adherence to the inconsistency rule, but suggests that courts adopt a
more precise definition of "inconsistency" in this context. 6 The proposed
rule would prohibit a defendant from denying a crime and asserting entrapment. It would not, however, require a defendant to admit the crime
as a prerequisite to an entrapment plea. A defendant could deny the
crime or not testify at all and receive entrapment instructions if the government's case-in-chief establishes entrapment as a matter of law.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
2. For discussion of the federal case law on inconsistent defenses in criminal cases, see infra
notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
3. For discussion of the four varying approaches, see infra notes 26-124 and accompanying
text.
4. Recent Supreme Court cases dealing with entrapment have focused on the nature of the
entrapment defense and have not addressed the issue whether the defense requires admission of the

crime. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (entrapment defense unavailable to
predisposed defendant); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (fact that government agent
supplied necessary ingredient for manufacture of illegal drugs does not establish entrapment where
defendant's predisposition to commit crime is conceded).
5. See infra notes 26-124 and accompanying text.

6. See infra notes 141-214 and accompanying text.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE

The United States Supreme Court first recognized the defense of entrapment in Sorrells v. United States.7 Charged with selling liquor to a
8
prohibition agent, Sorrells argued at trial that he had been entrapped.
The trial court rejected the defense, and the court of appeals affirmed. 9
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the evidence of entrapment
was sufficient to go to the jury.10 Although it acknowledged that government agents may detect crime by affording opportunities for its commission, the Court stated that "[a] different question is presented when the
criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they
implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the
alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may
prosecute." 1
The Court held that the entrapment defense has two elements.
First, the defendant must produce evidence that the offense "was committed at the instance of government officials." 12 Second, once the defendant produces such evidence, the trial court must focus on the
defendant's predisposition to commit the crime charged. The court
should determine "whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent
whom the government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is
the product of the creative activity of its own officials." 13 The Supreme
Court emphasized that entrapment was not an excuse for a guilty defendant; the entrapped individual is simply not guilty of committing a
crime. 14 The Court based its holding on statutory construction, asserting
that Congress could not have intended to punish individuals for crimes
that the government instigated. 15
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, dissented in
part and argued strongly for an alternative formulation of the defense
that would focus on the behavior of the government agents, not the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. 16 The dissent objected to
the artificiality of the majority's statutory construction analysis' 7 and argued that "courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the
7. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
8. Id. at 438.
9. Id. at 438-39.
10. Id. at 441.
11. Id. at 442.
12. Id. at 451.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 452.
15. Id. at 448.
16. Id. at 454 (Roberts, J., dissenting in part).
17. Id. at 456.
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government's own agents.""' In the dissent's view, the majority's emphasis on the predisposition of the defendant would cause prosecutors to

introduce evidence of bad character or past offenses, in effect putting the
accused on trial for previous acts. 19

Since Sorrells, the Court has continued to be divided over the formulation of the entrapment defense. A majority still supports the subjective approach focusing on the predisposition of the defendant to commit

the crime.20 And a vocal minority continues to advocate adopting the
2
objective test proposed by Justice Roberts. '

Even if the entrapment defense fails, a majority of the Supreme
Court has indicated that excessive governmental involvement in instigat-

ing criminal activity may give rise to a due process defense. 22 For example, in a lower court case, United States v. Twigg,23 government agents

supplied essential chemical ingredients and equipment and extensively
aided the defendant in setting up an illegal drug laboratory. The defendant argued that the government had entrapped him; alternatively, he ar-

gued that the government's conduct violated due process. 24 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the entrapment
18. Id. at 459.
19. Id. at 458-59.
20. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (entrapment comes into play only
when government actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the accused); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1958) (rejecting suggestion that Court adopt objective approach
to entrapment advocated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells).
21. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
The objective approach to entrapment focuses on the government's efforts to induce the crime.
The formulation of the objective entrapment defense is set forth in the Model Penal Code: entrapment occurs when the government employs "methods of persuasion or inducement [that] create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to
commit it." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962).
A number of state legislatures have adopted the objective approach to entrapment. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-209 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702237(1)(b) (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12(a)(2) (Vest
1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(a)(2) (Purdon 1983);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06(a) (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1) (1978). Other
states have adopted the objective entrapment standard by judicial decision. See Grossman v. State,
457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969); People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 690, 591 P.2d 947, 955, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 459, 467 (1979); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 390

Mich. 7, 22, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1973); State v. Wilkins, 144 Vt. 22, 29, 473 A.2d 295, 298 (1983).
22. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 493 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. 588 F.2d 373, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1978). It should be noted that while Twigg has not been
overruled, later Third Circuit cases have limited it to its facts. See United States v. Beverly, 723
F.2d 11, 12 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that Twigg has been limited by later Supreme Court and Third
Circuit decisions); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir.) (distinguishing Twigg), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
24. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 381-82.
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argument, but held that the government had abridged the defendant's
due process rights. 25 The court found no inconsistency in allowing the
defendant to argue that he was entrapped and that government agents
violated his due process rights.

II.

FEDERAL APPLICATION OF THE INCONSISTENCY RULE

Since Sorrells, numerous cases have arisen in which the defendant
has attempted to assert entrapment without conceding commission of the
crime charged. The federal courts of appeals have disagreed on the appropriate treatment of such cases, and four distinct approaches have
evolved. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits require a defendant to
admit commission of the crime as a prerequisite to asserting the entrapment defense. 26 The First, Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits allow a
defendant to remain silent and assert entrapment, but do not allow a
27
defendant who denies commission of the crime to plead entrapment.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a defendant who denies
the intent element of the crime may plead entrapment, but a defendant
who denies the acts charged may not.28 Finally, the Ninth Circuit and
the District of Columbia Circuit allow defendants to assert defenses regardless of inconsistency. 29
A.

Courts Requiring Admission of All Elements of the Crime.

The Third,30 Sixth,3 1 and Seventh Circuits32 adhere to the rule that
in order to plead entrapment, the defendant must first admit commission
25. Id. at 376, 380-81. A plurality of the Supreme Court has indicated that the defendant who
does not wish to raise the entrapment defense because of its predisposition aspect may rely solely on
the due process defense. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489 (1976) (plurality opinion).
26. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 63-109 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 110-24 and accompanying text.
30. See United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 514 (3d Cir. 1981) (entrapment defense requires
admission of all elements of crime charged); United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir.
1973) (defendant not entitled to entrapment instructions on charges he did not admit). But see
United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that defendant should be
allowed to deny mental element and plead entrapment), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cerL denied,
457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
31. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Whitley, 734 F.2d
1129, 1139 (6th Cir. 1984) (admission of every element of crime charged is a necessary prerequisite
to entrapment plea); United States v. Ranzoni, 732 F.2d 555, 560 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 916 (1984). But see United States v. Baker, 373 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1967) (denial of intent
does not preclude entrapment defense).
32. See United States v. Liparota, 735 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendant must admit
commission of offense in order to assert entrapment), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 419 (1985);
United States v. Johnston, 426 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1970) (same).
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of the crime charged. The rationale behind this rule is that a defendant
who has not committed a crime cannot have been the victim of entrap-

ment. Thus, until the fact of the crime has been established, entrapment
does not become an issue.
For example, in United States v. Bryant,3 3 Bryant was convicted for
the purchase of illegally obtained fox pelts. On appeal, Bryant objected
to the trial court's denial of his instruction on entrapment.3 4 The United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the action of the
trial judge, noting that "[w]hen carefully questioned by the court on this

issue, [Bryant] repeatedly refused to admit to all elements of the
crime."' 35 The court concluded that Bryant's failure to concede all ele36
ments of the crime precluded him from raising the entrapment defense.

B. Courts Requiring Silence as to the Elements of the Crime.
The First, 37 Second, 3 8 Fourth, 39 and Tenth Circuits 40 have held that
a defendant does not have to admit committing the crime in order to
plead entrapment, but the defendant may not deny the crime and plead
entrapment. 4 1 These courts have concluded that the defendant's silence
as to the elements of the crime is not inconsistent with an assertion of the
entrapment defense. 42 The courts have expressed the concern that requiring the defendant to admit committing the crime as a prerequisite to
raising the entrapment defense may violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights against compelled self-incrimination. 43
33. 716 F.2d 1091, 1092 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984).
34. Id. at 1094.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Caron, 588 F.2d
851, 852 (1st Cir. 1978) (defendant could plead entrapment where he had admitted sufficient facts to
warrant finding him guilty).
38. See infira notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
40. See Munroe v. United States, 424 F.2d 243, 244 (10th Cir. 1970) ("The law is well settled in
this circuit that if the defendant denies the commission of the crime charged, the defense of entrapment is not available to him.").
41. Although the Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue, it has indicated in dictum that it
would apply the same rule. See United States v. Kutrip, 670 F.2d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 1982) (trial
court's refusal to instruct on entrapment because defendant relied on necessity defense was not plain
error); Kibby v. United States, 372 F.2d 598, 601 (8th Cir.) (declining to decide whether defendant
can claim entrapment without admitting guilt), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967); Ware v. United
States, 259 F.2d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1958) (noting that since defendant denied crime, claim of entrapment would be inappropriate).
42. See, eg., United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1046 (Ist Cir. 1980) (discussed infra
notes 44-51 and accompanying text).
43. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Annese, 44 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit addressed the issue whether the defendant could refuse
to testify yet plead entrapment. In Annese, the trial court ruled that the
defendant was not entitled to instructions on entrapment unless he testified. 4 5 The defendant testified, was subjected to vigorous cross-examination,46 and was convicted. 47 On appeal, the First Circuit held that it was
error to require the defendant to testify as a precondition to using the
entrapment defense. 48 While noting that under circuit precedent a defendant who denies involvement in the crime may not plead entrapment,
the court held that a defendant may refuse to testify without waiving his
right to the entrapment defense. 49 The court pointed out that "[w]hile
the success of a defendant in convincing a jury that he was entrapped
may be reduced by his failure to testify, that is a choice that he has a
right to make free of any compulsion whatsoever." 50 The court reasoned
that requiring a defendant to admit the crime as a precondition to pleading entrapment "would raise a serious fifth amendment question." 51
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has developed a similar rule. In United States v. Valencia,52 the court held that
a nontestifying defendant could assert entrapment as a defense. The defendant was entitled to instructions on entrapment "since he did not take
the stand to deny personally his participation in the transaction and did
not affirmatively introduce any other evidence that he was not involved."'5 3 The court reserved the question whether entrapment would
be available to a defendant who testified that he was not involved in the
54
crime or who presented alibi witnesses.
In United States v. Mayo, 55 the Second Circuit addressed part of the
question it had left open in Valencia: whether a defendant who testifies
that he did not participate in the crime could also plead entrapment. The
court held that denial of the acts charged precluded the defendant from
asserting entrapment.5 6 The Mayo court, however, emphasized that it
was not deciding whether a defendant who admitted the acts charged but
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

631 F.2d 1041 (lst Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1047.
Id.
Id.
645 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1172.
Id.
705 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 72-73.
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offered "an explanation of his conduct that was consistent with his theory of entrapment" would be entitled to both defenses.57 This language
from Mayo indicates that the Second Circuit may be willing to consider
adopting the more flexible rule followed in the Fifth Circuit, which allows a defendant to deny the intent element of the crime and assert
entrapment. 58
In United States v. Dorta,59 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit rejected a prior circuit decision that allowed the assertion of inconsistent defenses60 and held that a defendant could not deny
the crime and assert entrapment. The court noted that the rule against
inconsistent defenses has been adopted by the majority of the federal
courts of appeals6 1 and concluded that the rule was justified "in the interest of protecting the integrity and the truth-finding function of our crimi'62
nal trials."
C. Courts Allowing Defendant to Deny Intent.
The Fifth Circuit 63 and the Eleventh Circuit 64 currently allow a defendant to plead entrapment so long as he does not deny the acts
charged. The defendant may, however, deny the intent element of the
crime or simply not admit either act or intent.
In Henderson v. United States,65 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit demonstrated its willingness to take a flexible approach to the issue of inconsistent defenses. According to the court, the
goal of a trial is to determine the truth, and inconsistent defenses should
be permitted when they will be helpful in arriving at the truth. 66 The
degree to which permitting inconsistent defenses is helpful in determining the truth, however, depends on the degree of inconsistency. 67 The
court concluded that in certain cases proof of entrapment will "be so
contrary ... to proof that the defendant is... not guilty [of the crime]
'6
... that the proof of the one necessarily disproves the other.
In Sears v. United States,69 the Fifth Circuit indicated that the de57. Id. at 73.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit rule, see infra notes 65-106 and accompanying text.
783 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3274 (1986).
Id. at 1181 (citing Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1958)).
Id.
Id. at 1181-82.
See infra notes 65-106 and accompanying text.

64. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 173.
343 F.2d 139, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1965).
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fendant could raise the entrapment defense even if the defendant denied
committing the crime charged, provided the government's evidence introduced the entrapment issue. The court stated that "[w]e do not think
it is impermissibly inconsistent for a defendant to deny the acts charged,
yet urge the court on motion for acquittal that the government's own
evidence establishes entrapment as a matter of law."'70 Sears goes farther
than Henderson did, since it permits a defendant to deny all elements of
the crime and still rely on entrapment.
For a period of time, two lines of Fifth Circuit cases conflicted over
whether a defendant could deny the intent element of the crime and also
present evidence on entrapment. One line of cases held that it was not
impermissibly inconsistent for a defendant to argue that he lacked criminal intent but also argue entrapment as an alternative defense, 71 while
72
another line of cases reached the opposite conclusion.
The Fifth Circuit recognized and resolved the conflict between these
two lines of cases in United States v. Henry (Henry I).73 Henry I involved a prosecution for illegally prescribing drugs. 74 Henry admitted at
trial that he prescribed the drugs, but denied that he intended to prescribe them for nonmedicinal purposes.7 5 The trial court refused to in-

struct the jury on entrapment, relying on the cases holding that a
76
defendant may not plead both lack of intent and entrapment.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the conflicting circuit
precedent on whether the entrapment defense is available to a defendant
70. Id. at 143.
71. An example is United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977), which involved a
prosecution for illegally prescribing drugs. The trial court refused to instruct on entrapment because
of Greenfield's testimony that he had prescribed the drugs for a legitimate medical purpose. Id. at
181. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Greenfield could argue "that he did not knowingly
dispense the drugs without a legitimate medical purpose or, alternatively, he may argue that to the
extent that he may have prescribed without a legitimate medical purpose, he was not predisposed to
do so." Id. at 183. The court found that "the entrapment defense is not so inconsistent with the
defense of lack of intent under the circumstances of this case as to preclude the alternative defenses."
Id. See also United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 271 (5th Cir. 1983) (defense of lack of intent not
inconsistent with entrapment defense), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984).
72. See United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982). At
trial, Nicoll claimed that he had participated in the charged drug conspiracy only to "lead on" the
DEA in the hope of obtaining some cocaine for his personal use. Id. at 1314. On appeal he urged
the court to find that he had been entrapped as a matter of law. The court held that Nicoll had failed
to establish the entrapment issue at trial because he relied on a mens rea defense. As a result, the
court refused to consider entrapment on appeal. Id. See also McCarty v. United States, 379 F.2d
285, 286 (5th Cir.) (defendant who denied intent element of the crime not entitled to entrapment
instructions), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967).
73. 727 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.), rev'd en banc, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
74. Id. at 1374.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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who admits the acts charged but denies the intent element of the crime. 77
The court noted that while Henry denied intent to commit a criminal act,
his reliance on the entrapment defense constituted an assertion that he
had criminal intent but that the government agent had implanted it.78
The court reasoned that "[i]f there [are] degrees of inconsistency ...this
seems an instance of a high one: not only that a culpable intent both did
and did not exist in the same person at the same time, but that if it did it
had a particular cause."' 79 The court found "no significant force in the
reasoning by which an exception is made for the element of intent alone
from the concessions required to raise the entrapment defense" 80 and
concluded that the trial court had acted correctly in refusing to instruct
81
on entrapment.
On rehearing en bane, however, the Fifth Circuit voted 8-6 to reverse the panel's decision.8 2 The en bane court, in Henry II, first noted
that the panel had erroneously characterized the entrapment defense as
"being in the nature of a confession and avoidance. '8 3 Under that analysis the panel had concluded that the issue of entrapment, which concerns
the origin of the defendant's criminal intent, becomes relevant only after
the defendant has conceded that he committed the criminal act with the
requisite intent.8 4 The Henry II majority rejected the panel's formulation of entrapment, finding it to be inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions outlining the defense.8 5 According to the Henry 11 court, the
entrapment defense does not function as an excuse or justification for a
guilty defendant; the entrapment victim is simply not guilty. 6 Thus,
conceding guilt cannot be a prerequisite to an entrapment plea. Instead,
a nontestifying defendant "may rest upon his not guilty plea and ask the
jury to evaluate all of the evidence in the case relevant to a guilty or not
guilty verdict, including evidence that, because of entrapment, he did not
87
have the requisite criminal intent.
The Henry 11 majority next addressed the question "whether a different rule should apply when (as here) a defendant elects to testify to his
personal belief that he acted without criminal intent. 8 8s Noting the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1374-76.
Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203, 214 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id.
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"amorphous and subjective"8 9 nature of the intent element of a crime,
the court reasoned that it was possible for the defendant and the jury to
disagree over whether the defendant's intent was criminal at the time the
act charged was committed. 90 Consequently, the court held that a twostep inquiry was appropriate in situations where the defendant has denied the intent element but also requests instructions on entrapment.
First, the jury should determine whether the defendant has committed a
crime by assessing the evidence relevant to criminal intent.9 1 If the jury
concludes that the defendant did act with criminal intent, the jury must
then decide whether that intent originated in the defendant or was im92
planted by the government.
In its analysis, the Henry 11 majority relied heavily on the "degree of
inconsistency" test outlined in United States v. Henderson.93 The court
noted that entrapment focuses on the defendant's predisposition and concluded that the evidence that the defendant could produce to negate an
inference of criminal intent would also tend to show absence of predisposition. 94 Thus, the Henry II majority concluded that it is
not too inconsistent for a defendant to testify that he did not have the
criminal intent required for conviction and then, through his lawyer's
argument and the court's instruction on the law, to urge the jury, in
the event it rejects his personal view concerning intent, to find that the
95
evidence requires acquittal on the basis of the entrapment doctrine.
Six judges dissented in Henry 11.96 Although it admitted that the

panel in Henry I was incorrect in its characterization of entrapment as
being in the nature of confession and avoidance, 97 the dissent adhered to
the panel's conclusion. In the dissent's view, the defendant should not be
permitted "to swear that he had no criminal intent and in the same
breath to argue that he had one that did not originate with him."9 8s The
dissent saw no significant difference between requiring a testifying defendant to concede commission of the act charged in order to plead entrapment and requiring concession of criminal intent. 99 The dissent also
found fault with the majority's characterization of intent as "amorphous
and subjective," commenting that Henry swore under oath that he acted
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 214.
at 213.
at 212 (citing United States v. Henderson, 237 F.2d 169, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1956)).
at 213.
at 214.
at 215 n.3 (Gee, J., dissenting).

98. Id. at 214.

99. Id. at 216.
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without criminal intent: "There was nothing amorphous about Henry's
testimony, and, in Henry's own mind, nothing amorphous about his intent."10 0 The dissent concluded that "in a proceeding so serious as a
criminal trial" it should be impermissible for a defendant to "take the
stand, solemnly swear to one thing, argue the contrary of his sworn testimony, and be acquitted on the latter basis." 10 1
In the aftermath of Henry II, a question may arise as to the continued viability of the rule formulated in Sears v. United States, 102 which
allows a defendant to deny the crime and plead entrapment if the government's evidence raises the entrapment issue. 10 3 Henry II indicates that a
defendant may not deny the acts charged and obtain instructions on entrapment, even when the defendant asserts that the government's evidence establishes entrapment as a matter of law.' °4 In Sears, however,
the court allowed just such a combination of defenses. 105 The Henry II
majority apparently overlooked this conflict because it cited Sears approvingly. 10 6 Although Henry II conflicts with Sears, Sears has not been
expressly overruled. Thus, it is unclear how the Fifth Circuit will resolve
the issue raised in Sears.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit still
follows the Sears rule. In United States v. Haimowitz, 107 the court held
that a defendant who pleads entrapment may not deny commission of the
acts charged unless the government's case-in-chief "injects substantial evidence of entrapment into the case."' 0 8 Since the Fifth Circuit decided
Henry II after the Eleventh Circuit was created, its holding is not binding on the Eleventh Circuit. It is unclear as yet how the Eleventh Circuit
will resolve the pre-Henry conflict in Fifth Circuit precedent regarding
the availability of the entrapment defense to a defendant who denies the
intent element of the crime. 10 9
D. Courts Allowing Inconsistent Defenses.
Courts in the Ninth Circuit" 0 and the District of Columbia Cir100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965).
103. Id. at 143.
104. Henry II, 749 F.2d at 205.
105. Sears, 343 F.2d at 143.
106. Henry II,749 F.2d at 206 n.1.
107. 725 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
108. Id. at 1573-74.
109. See United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161, 1169 (11th Cir. 1985) (declining to resolve the
conflicting Fifth Circuit precedent).
110. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
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cuit"Il allow defendants to assert inconsistent defenses. The rationale

given for this rule is that a criminal defendant "should be accorded every
reasonable protection in defending himself against governmental

prosecution."'

12

In Eastman v. United States, 113 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit refused to permit a plea of entrapment where the
defendant had not conceded commission of the crime. In United States v.
Demma, 114 however, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc abandoned that
position and held that defendants could assert inconsistent defenses.
The Demma court attacked the theoretical basis of the Eastman

rule on several grounds. First, the court found that requiring concession
of the crime as a prerequisite to an entrapment plea conflicted with the

Supreme Court's holding in Sorrells that entrapment was raised by a not
guilty plea.11 5 Second, the court held that even assuming the validity of
the inconsistency theory on which the Eastman rule was based, the rule
was overly broad. True inconsistency, the court argued, arises only when
the defendant himself asserts two defenses that cannot both be accepted
by the jury.1 16 The Eastman rule, however, would preclude the defendant from denying the crime and pleading entrapment even when the government's evidence, not the defendant's, introduces the entrapment
issue. 117 The court went on to reject the inconsistency theory itself, asserting that "[i]t is well established that a defendant in a criminal prosecution may assert inconsistent defenses." 118 The court concluded that
there was no justification for making an exception to the rule allowing
111. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
112. United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975).
113. 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954).
114. 523 F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
115. Id. at 983.
116. Id. at 984.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 985. As authority, the Demma court cited a number of cases. The first, United
States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1970), held that a defendant who denied participation in a
criminal conspiracy was entitled to instructions on entrapment where he argued that the government's evidence established entrapment as a matter of law. Id. at 611-12. These defenses are not
truly inconsistent. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. Thus, Harrell does not support
the proposition that inconsistent defenses are appropriate in a criminal case.
The Demma court also relied on United States v. Harbin, 377 F.2d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1967)
("inconsistent defenses may of course be made" in a criminal case). The Fourth Circuit, however,
has recently rejected the rationale expressed in Harbin, holding that the entrapment defense may not
be asserted by a criminal defendant who denies committing the crime. See United States v. Dorta,
783 F.2d 1179, 1181 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3274 (1986).
Finally, the court cited a number of decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and one by a California state court. Both these jurisdictions allow the assertion of
inconsistent defenses by criminal defendants. See infra notes 121-24, and accompanying text; see
also People v. Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965).
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inconsistent defenses when one of the defenses is entrapment." 9 Finally,
although the Demma court specifically stated that it was not basing its
holding on constitutional grounds, it argued that "[c]ontinued adherence
to Eastman would have generated serious constitutional problems by
conditioning the assertion of a defense on the defendant's yielding his
presumption of innocence, his right to remain silent, and his right to
have the Government prove the elements of the crime beyond a reason1 20
able doubt."
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also allows criminal defendants to assert defenses regardless of
their inconsistency, 121 but does not view entrapment as inconsistent with
other defenses,1 22 at least when evidence of entrapment is introduced by
the government's witnesses. In Hansford v. United States,123 the court
explained that "[lt was consistent with defendant's denial of the transaction to urge that if the jury believed it did occur the government's evi124
dence as to how it occurred indicated entrapment."'

III.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DISAGREEMENT

Three major factors contribute to the variation in the approaches
the federal courts of appeals have adopted regarding the assertion of entrapment and inconsistent defenses. First, there are differing views
among the circuits about the assertion of inconsistent defenses in criminal cases in general. The Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit, which both follow the rule that a defendant may plead entrapment and deny the crime, also both allow assertion of inconsistent defenses in nonentrapment cases.125 Reasoning that there is no justification
for making an exception when entrapment is one of the defenses raised,
these courts allow assertion of any combination of defenses regardless of
26
consistency. 1
The other ten circuits, all of which restrict a defendant's ability to
plead entrapment and other defenses, do not have a clear general rule
regarding inconsistent defenses in criminal cases. Few, if any, cases from
these circuits have addressed the inconsistency issue outside the context
119. Demma, 523 F.2d at 985.
120. Id. at 986.
121. See, eg., Whittaker v. United States, 281 F.2d 631, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (inconsistent defenses may be interposed in criminal cases).
122. See Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
123. 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
124. Id. at 221.
125. See United States v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975);
Whittaker v. United States, 281 F.2d 631, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975).
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of entrapment. 127 Nor do the entrapment cases give any guidance on the
question whether inconsistent defenses are available in criminal cases
generally. One Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Smith, 128 stated
that the rule prohibiting assertion of entrapment and other defenses is an
exception, for "defendants may assert inconsistent defenses in other contexts."' 129 The court, however, cited no authority. Thus, among the
courts of appeals that have applied the inconsistency rule in cases involving pleas of entrapment, there appears to be no precedent either supporting or denying the existence of an inconsistency rule in criminal cases
outside the entrapment context.
Second, the variation in approaches reflects differing interpretations
of the nature and function of the entrapment defense. There is disagreement, for example, over whether a defendant can be entrapped into committing noncriminal acts. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Demma 130 stated that entrapment focused on whether the government induced the acts charged, regardless of
whether it also induced criminal intent. It followed that denial of criminal intent was not inconsistent with an entrapment plea; a defendant
could argue that the government entrapped him into committing acts
that were not criminal because he lacked intent. 131 In contrast, the dissent in Henry II emphasized that the focus of entrapment was on the
origin of the defendant's criminal intent. 132 A jury could not, in the
Henry II dissent's view, conclude both that the defendant lacked the req133
uisite intent and that he had been entrapped.
This disagreement can be attributed in part to the Sorrells decision.
At times the Court uses language suggesting that government instigation
of the acts charged is the essence of entrapment, 3 4 while at other times
the Court defines entrapment as the implantation by government agents
127. The author has not discovered any cases from these circuits that consider the inconsistency
rule where entrapment was not one of the defenses raised.
Examples of nonentrapment cases where inconsistent defenses were allowed include Johnson v.
United States, 426 F.2d 651, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) (denial of sexual intercourse and claim
of consent), cert. dismissed, 401 U.S. 846 (1971); and Whittaker v. United States, 281 F.2d 631, 632
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (denial of underlying acts and claim of insanity).
128. 757 F.2d 1161 (1lth Cir. 1985).
129. Id. at 1167.
130. 523 F.2d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1975).
131. Id.
132. Henry 11, 749 F.2d at 214 (Gee, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448 (entrapment defined as "instigation by government officials of an
act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish
them").
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of criminal intent in the mind of the accused.13 5
The function of the entrapment defense has also been the subject of
disagreement. The Demma majority asserted that "[tlhe primary func-

tion of entrapment is to safeguard the integrity of the law enforcement
and prosecution process,"' 136 thereby justifying a rule that allowed a defendant to argue entrapment whenever there was evidence of unaccept-

able government activity in inducing crime. Justice Roberts, however,
who proposed this interpretation of the purpose of the entrapment de-

fense in his dissenting opinion in Sorrells, noted that the Sorrells majority
implicitly rejected this view of entrapment as a "fundamental rule of
public policy.' 1 37 Post-Sorrells Supreme Court decisions indicate that
due process analysis, rather than the entrapment defense, is appropriate

to guard against undue government involvement in the creation of
138

crime.
Finally, the courts differ as to when defenses should be considered

inconsistent. Some courts argue that the inconsistency rule should apply
and bar the defendant from presenting inconsistent defenses only when

the defendant presents evidence in support of more than one defense. 139
Other courts would extend the inconsistency rule when the defendant

presents evidence on one defense but allows his counsel to assert other
defenses during argument. 140
IV.

IN DEFENSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY RULE

An evaluation of the continued desirability of the inconsistency rule
must focus on balancing society's interest in the truth-finding function of
criminal trials against the need to protect the interests of criminal de135. Id. at 442 (criminal design originates with government and is implanted in mind of
accused).
136. Demma, 523 F.2d at 985.
137. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J.,dissenting in part).
138. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
139. See, eg., United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1573-74 (11th Cir. 1984) (defendant
may deny crime and raise entrapment defense where government's case-in-chief provides evidence of
entrapment); United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant can assert
dual defenses of noninvolvement and entrapment "since he did not take the stand to deny personally
his participation in the transaction and did not affirmatively introduce any other evidence that he
was not involved"); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965) (not impermissibly
inconsistent for defendant to deny acts charged and argue that government's evidence establishes
entrapment as a matter of law).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1973) (defendant who did not
admit commission of crime charged was not entitled to raise entrapment defense). See supra notes
30-36 and accompanying text.
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fendantsYt 4 t This balance will necessarily be different than the balance of
interests in a civil proceeding. First, because a criminal act is a wrong

against society, society has an interest in determining guilt which is not
present in civil proceedings. 14 2 Second, a criminal defendant is entitled
to additional constitutional protections when the government's investigative and prosecutorial forces are arrayed against him.143 The optimum
balance between society's interest and the defendant's interest can be accomplished by adopting an inconsistency rule that prohibits the criminal
defendant from arguing positions that are mutually exclusive, while requiring the government to prove every element of the charges against the
defendant.

This note's proposed rule looks to the basic purpose of the inconsistency rule to redefine the rule with three major exceptions. The basic
purpose of the current inconsistency rule is to preserve the truth-seeking

function of criminal trials.

44

Thus, under the proposed inconsistency

rule the courts should not permit a defendant simultaneously to deny the

acts charged or the intent element of the crime and claim that he was
entrapped. The positions are mutually exclusive.' 4 5 But, in order to

fully protect the defendant from the risk that government informants will
commit perjury, the courts must also instruct on entrapment when the
government's evidence, standing alone, presents the entrapment issue,
even if the defendant denies committing the crime charged.' 4 6 Second,
the courts should not interpret the rule to require affirmative admission
of the crime as a prerequisite to an entrapment defense.' 47 Thus, courts
should not bar a nontestifying defendant from pleading entrapment if it
is raised by the evidence.
141. See Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1956) (goal of trials is to arrive
at the truth; degree of inconsistency should be considered in determining whether inconsistent positions will help or hinder search for truth).
142. See, e.g., Thompson v. Bannan, 298 F.2d 611, 614 (6th Cir.) ("The public has an interest in
criminal prosecutions and they are made for the protection of the citizens of a state and in order that
there may be orderly government under law."), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 957 (1962).
143. For example, the sixth amendment right to counsel comes into play in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1146 (1986) (purpose of sixth amendment right to
counsel is to assure that defendant receives legal assistance when facing society's prosecutorial
forces). The fifth amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination is also applicable.
See id. at 1140 (compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation led Court to establish Miranda procedures to protect the accused's privilege against self-incrimination).
144. See United States v. Dorta, 783 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (4th Cir.) (purpose of inconsistency rule
in entrapment cases is to protect integrity and truth-finding function of criminal trials), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 3274 (1986).
145. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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The proposed inconsistency rule has many advantages. It protects
the defendant when the government's evidence standing alone establishes
entrapment, 14 8 avoids the constitutional problems of requiring a defendant to plead guilty, 14 9 and prohibits the affirmative presentation of mutually exclusive defenses. 150 Prohibiting the defendant from presenting
mutually exclusive defenses helps to prevent perjury,15 1 jury confusion, 152 and an erosion of the defendant's credibility.1 5 3 Finally, public
policy arguments that favor allowing inconsistent defenses as a means to
protect against overzealous government agents fail to recognize that the
federal courts apply a subjective entrapment test and that the due process
154
defense provides protection from overzealous government agents.
The proposed rule protects a defendant by requiring instructions on
entrapment if the government's evidence, standing alone, establishes the
defense. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Hansfordv. United States15 5 pointed out, the defendant
who denies the crime and argues that the government's evidence shows
entrapment as a matter of law is not really presenting inconsistent defenses.1 56 The defendant is, in effect, arguing that the government's contention that he committed a crime is false, but that even if it were true, he
would not be guilty because of entrapment.1 57 The defendant's two arguments are not mutually exclusive; it may be true both that the defendant
did not commit the crime and that the government's case-in-chief established entrapment. Denying instructions on entrapment in this situation
would be unfair. It would allow the jury to convict the defendant in
reliance on the government's evidence when that same evidence establishes entrapment. In such a situation, the judge should instruct the jury
on entrapment but not allow the defendant to present any evidence sup148. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 163-92 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 200-14 and accompanying text.
155. 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
156. See also Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1965) (denial of crime and
assertion that government's evidence establishes entrapment as a matter of law are not inconsistent
positions).
157. Government informers frequently have a substantial motive both to entrap the defendant
and to commit perjury. See Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did EatDenial of Crime and the Entrapment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254, 263 & n.40.
Groot notes that frequently the informant is under indictment for the same crime that he is
attempting to induce others to commit or is being paid by the government on a per conviction basis.
Id. In either event, the informant has much to gain (dismissal of a pending indictment against him
or the contingent fee) from entrapping the accused and then denying that entrapment occurred. Id
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porting the entrapment claim, since that would be inconsistent with denial of the crime.
The proposed inconsistency rule also avoids the constitutional
problems that arise when courts require a defendant to admit the crime
in order to plead entrapment. Both courts1 58 and commentators t59 have
noted that requiring admission of the crime may violate the defendant's
fifth amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination. The
requirement also conflicts with the statement in Sorrells that pleading not
guilty raises the entrapment defense. 160 The proposed rule allows the
defendant to remain silent, rely on the presumption of innocence, and
require the government to prove every element of its case against the
defendant. Thus, the proposed rule is superior to the rule currently ap161
plied in the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.
The proposed inconsistency rule prohibits a defendant from affirmatively presenting inconsistent defenses. A contrary rule would impose
unjustified costs on society-by impairing the trial's truth-seeking function and promoting perjury, for example-and would not significantly
benefit defendants. Permitting a defendant to deny any element of the
crime and plead entrapment promotes perjury because it gives the defendant the benefit of one defense that cannot be true. 162 Moreover, allowing both defenses may unnecessarily confuse the jury and is likely to
adversely affect the defendant's credibility.
Permitting a defendant to argue two defenses that cannot both be
true is equivalent to sanctioning perjury by the defendant. For example,
in United States v. Henry, 163 Henry testified that he prescribed drugs for
a legitimate reason and thus lacked the requisite criminal intent. If
Henry's testimony were true, he could not have been entrapped, because
the essence of entrapment is that the government implants criminal in158. See, e.g., United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v.
Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1975).
159. Groot, supra note 157, at 278; Nagle, Inconsistent Defenses in Criminal Cases, 92 MIL. L.
REV. 77, 98 (1981); Note, Denialof the Crime and the Availability of the EntrapmentDefense in the
FederalCourts, 22 B.C.L. REV. 911, 930-31 (1981).
160. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
161. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
162. See Note, supra note 159, at 931 (allowing assertion of inconsistent defenses gives defendant
"license to lie").
The Supreme Court has indicated that the protection of a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights does not extend to allowing the defendant to commit perjury. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 106
S. Ct. 988, 998 (1986) (when an accused proposes to resort to perjury, he takes the risk that counsel
will withdraw; withdrawal of counsel in such a situation does not violate the sixth amendment right
to counsel); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (holding that illegally obtained evidence
can be used to impeach a defendant; allowing defendant to affirmatively resort to perjury cannot be
justified).
163. 749 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
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Of course, the converse is also true; if Henry

was entrapped, his testimony about his intent must be false. Allowing
Henry to argue both that he lacked intent and that he was entrapped

thus allows him either to commit perjury or to take advantage of a defense that cannot be true.

A criminal defendant has no right to commit perjury or to have the
assistance of counsel in the presentation of perjury.1 65 An attorney is
ethically obligated to refuse to present false evidence. 1 66 If the attorney

learns that his client committed perjury after the fact, the attorney may
be required to inform the court that the evidence was false. 167 These
ethical obligations prohibit a defense attorney from assisting his client in
asserting inconsistent defenses when to do so would be tantamount to
aiding perjury.

Nor does a defense counsel's refusal to allow the client to present
false testimony violate the client's right to effective assistance of coun-

sel.168 The question of how far a criminal defense attorney can go in
preventing or disclosing client perjury has been the subject of a great deal
of controversy. 169 A recent Supreme Court case, Nix v. Whiteside, 170
dealt directly with this question. Whiteside's counsel, Robinson, learned
before trial that his client planned to testify falsely. 171 Robinson warned

Whiteside against committing perjury, advising Whiteside that if he com164. See, ag., Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
165. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. 988, 998 (1986).
166. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4), (7) (1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2(d), 3.3(a)(4) (1983).
167. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1981) (attorney
must inform court if client fails to rectify pejury); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.3 comment 11 (1983) (attorney must inform court if withdrawal is impossible or will not
remedy the situation). The District of Columbia Bar, however, has proposed a new code of ethics
that would allow criminal defense attorneys to let their clients lie on the stand if the lawyer is unable
to dissuade the client from lying or to withdraw from the case without seriously harming the client.
See D.C. Bar Wants a New Code of Ethics, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1986, at D2, col. 1.
168. Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 998-99.
169. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment 7 (1983); Appel
& McGrane, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjuryand the CriminalJustice System: The State's Position,
23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19 (1985); Grady, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjury and the CriminalJustice
System: The Defendant's Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1985); Rieger, Client Perjury: A Pro.
posed Resolution of the Constitutionaland Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121 (1985), Wolfram,
Client Perjury: The Kutak Commission and the Association of Trial Lawyers, Lying Clients and the
Adversary System, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 964.
170. 106 S.Ct. 988 (1986).
171. Whiteside was accused of murder but claimed he had acted in self-defense. Id. at 991.
Whiteside had consistently stated to his attorney, Robinson, that he had not actually seen a gun, but
was convinced that the victim had a gun in his hand. Id. A week before trial, however, he told his
attorneys that he had seen something "metallic" in the victim's hand. Id. When questioned further
about this, Whiteside responded, "If I don't say I saw a gun I'm dead." Id. This was the basis for
Robinson's conclusion that Whiteside intended to commit perjury.
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mitted perjury, it would be Robinson's duty to inform the court. 172 In
addition, Robinson said he would seek to withdraw from the case if
Whiteside insisted on committing perjury.1 73 In his habeas corpus petition, Whiteside claimed that Robinson's actions constituted a denial of
effective assistance of counsel. 174
The Supreme Court held that Whiteside's sixth amendment rights
had not been violated.1 75 The Court could discern "no failure to adhere
to reasonable professional standards that would in any sense make out a
deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 176 The Court
noted that "at most [Whiteside] was denied ... the assistance of counsel
in the presentation of false testimony." 17 7 Although the Court stopped
short of "constitutionaliz[ing]" any ethical standards, 178 the majority
opinion clearly approved of these standards. 179 After Nix it is hard to
imagine a situation in which a defense attorney who complied with the
ethical rules concerning client perjury would be found to have failed to
provide effective assistance of counsel.
The Nix Court concluded that the criminal defendant's right to have
counsel present all appropriate defenses does not extend to the presentation of false testimony.18 0 The same rationale applies to the presentation
of inconsistent defenses and justifies prohibiting a criminal defendant
from affirmatively presenting inconsistent defenses.
The problem of perjury is not unique to criminal trials. Thus, in
itself, the possibility that perjury will occur does not seem to justify
prohibiting inconsistent defenses in criminal cases while allowing them in
civil cases. Closer analysis of the perjury problem, however, suggests
that prohibition of inconsistent defenses is, in fact, justified.
First, analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2),181 which
allows inconsistent positions in civil cases, indicates that the rule is not
meant to sanction perjury. Rule 8(e)(2) is a rule of pleading; it allows a
party who is in doubt as to what the evidence will show to advance more
than one theory as grounds for relief.182 Inconsistent pleadings are, how172. Id. at 992.
173. Id.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
troubled by
attorneys in
179. Id.
180. Id.

at 997.
at 998.
at 994. But see id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I ... am
the Court's implicit adoption of a set of standards of professional responsibility for
state criminal proceedings.").
at 994-97.
at 998.

181. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
182. See Banco Continental v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 406 F.2d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ever, subject to the requirements of honesty in pleading.18 3 The signature
of the party's attorney on the pleading certifies "that he has read the
pleading [and] that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact."' 8 4 Thus,
nothing in Rule 8(e)(2) suggests that civil litigants may commit perjury
by testifying that each of two mutually exclusive positions is true.
Nor have courts applied Rule 8(e)(2) so as to permit perjury. Under
the Rule, courts have allowed civil litigants to rely on inconsistent legal
theories as grounds for relief.18 5 For example, in a suit to enforce a contract, the defendant might argue both that no contract was ever formed
and that if a contract was formed, a clause in that contract excuses performance by the defendant.186 Although these two positions cannot both
be true, under the civil rule the litigant who is in doubt as to what the
facts will show is permitted to assert both and let the judge or jury decide
whether either defense is valid under the applicable law. The inconsistency here is between legal conclusions (is the defendant excused from
performance because no contract was formed? If not, does a clause of
the contract excuse defendant's performance?), not between statements
of fact. Allowing inconsistent pleading of this kind does not sanction
peijury.
Thus, analysis of Rule 8(e)(2) and the cases interpreting it does not
indicate that inconsistency of positions rising to the level of perjury
should be permitted. Allowing a civil party to plead a defense based on
the contract while also denying the existence of the contract is very different from allowing a criminal defendant to say, "I wasn't there, but if I
was, they entrapped me." The fact that Rule 8(e)(2) authorizes the former does not suggest that courts should allow the latter.
There is also greater concern about perjury in criminal than in civil
cases. A comparison of the discovery provisions in federal civil and
criminal proceedings demonstrates this concern. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a civil litigant has broad access to his oppo183. See 2A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE q 8.33, at 8-230 (2d ed. 1986) (noting
that alternative pleadings are subject to requirements of Rule 11).
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
185. See, e.g.. City of Kingsport v. Steel & Roof Structure, Inc., 500 F.2d 617, 619 (6th Cir.
1974) (party can plead statute of limitations in bar of claim and alternatively seek indemnification):
Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 790 (5th Cir. 1973) (corporation can
assert three different theories of relief: fraud, breach of contract, and breach ofwarranty); Honey v.
George Hyman Constr. Co., 63 F.R.D. 443, 451 (D.D.C. 1974) (plaintiff can plead both res ipsa
loquitur and specific acts of negligence).
186. Cf Genesco, Inc. v. Joint Council 13, United Shoe Workers of Am.. 341 F.2d 482, 484 (2d
Cir. 1965) (union had right to claim that action was barred by arbitration clause while reserving
right to deny existence of contract).
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nent's documentary evidence and witnesses. 187 The extensive civil discovery provisions advance the search for truth and eliminate the unfair
use of surprise. 18 8 In contrast, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
limit the defendant's access to the evidence that the prosecution plans to
use. Under the federal rules, the defense is entitled to pretrial discovery
only of the defendant's own prior statements. I 89 A defendant can obtain
prior statements of the prosecution's witnesses after they have testified at
trial for purposes of impeachment, 190 but a defendant has no right to
pretrial discovery of such statements.191
The decision to limit discovery rights in criminal cases reflects, at
least in part, a concern that criminal defendants are more likely than civil
litigants to commit perjury. 192 By refusing to extend fuller discovery to
criminal defendants, Congress has indicated that in its view, this risk
outweighs the benefits produced by liberal discovery rules: elimination of
the use of surprise tactics and more complete exposure of relevant facts.
Congress not only treats civil and criminal discovery differently but
also treats the use of inconsistent defenses differently. Congress specifically provided that a civil litigant can present inconsistent defenses in
civil trials. 193 Congress's failure to enact a corresponding rule for criminal proceedings may indicate that Congress intended to deny criminal
defendants the opportunity to raise inconsistent defenses.1 94 The difference in discovery provisions in civil and criminal proceedings buttresses
that conclusion; the same consideration-preventing perjury-that led
Congress to limit criminal discovery applies even more strongly to the
issue of inconsistent defenses. The greater concern about perjury in
criminal cases justifies prohibiting presentation of inconsistent defenses
in criminal proceedings, even though inconsistent defenses are allowed in
civil cases.
187. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
188. See J. UNDERWOOD, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES 3 (2d ed. 1985).

189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1982).
191. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (criminal discovery is not comparable to civil discovery because of greater danger of perjury). See generally W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3, at 727-28 (1985) (discussing argument that
criminal discovery should be limited because criminal defendant has more at stake than does civil
litigant and therefore has greater incentive for perjury).
193. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
194. Courts commonly assume that when Congress makes specific provisions in one part of a
statutory scheme but not in another, the omission was intentional. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1979) (justifying decision that no implied private right of action
exists under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act by noting that other sections of the Act
granted express private rights of action).
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Another reason for prohibiting defendants from denying the crime

and arguing entrapment is that such inconsistent defenses may confuse
the jury. Even with the clearest instructions from the court, a jury is
likely to be bewildered by a defendant who swears to one thing and argues another. 195 Confusing the jury will not necessarily benefit the de-

fendant, and it may actually harm him. In any event, confusing the jury
will not promote the truth-seeking function of the trial. Although jury
confusion is also likely to occur when inconsistent positions are taken in

a civil case, the court can use a special verdict in a civil trial to minimize
confusion.' 96 The device of a special verdict, however, is generally un197

available in a criminal trial.
A related problem is the adverse effect on a defendant's credibility
that is likely to result when a defendant presents conflicting defenses.

The court in United States v. Demma noted that "[i]nconsistent testimony by the defendant seriously impairs and potentially destroys his
credibility."' 198 Nonetheless, the court held that the defendant was enti-

tled to take that chance. 199 Again, this concern is equally applicable to
civil cases. Although the harm to the defendant's credibility may not
independently justify the inconsistency rule, it at least suggests that
prohibiting a defendant from arguing inconsistent defenses is unlikely to
have a detrimental effect on the defendant's case.
Some courts2°° and commentators 20 1 advance public policy argu-

ments in favor of allowing a defendant who denies the crime to argue
entrapment. The arguments would be persuasive if the primary purpose

of the entrapment defense was to deter police instigation of criminal activity. 20 2 Allowing defendants to argue entrapment whenever there is ev195. See Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954), overruled by United States
v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975).
196. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 705 F.2d 434, 437 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("Special verdicts in
criminal jury trials are generally disfavored." (quoting United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979))).
198. Demma, 523 F.2d at 985.
199. Id.
200. See, id.,
at 985 (function of entrapment defense is to safeguard integrity of the law enforcement process). The Demma court relied on Justice Roberts's partial dissent in Sorrells. See id. at
983 n.1. The Sorrells majority, however, implicitly rejected this public policy justification for the
entrapment defense, and relied instead on a legislative intent rationale for entrapment. Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 448-49. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
201. See Nagle, supra note 159, at 125 (inconsistency rule allows police misconduct to go unchallenged); Note, The Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases, 56 IOWA L. Rri.,
686, 695 (1971) (basic purpose of entrapment defense is to deter wrongful police conduct).
202. An entrapment rule formulated to deter police misconduct would, of course, focus oi the
methods employed by the government rather than the predisposition of the accused. See Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (focus should be on whether
government conduct falls below proper standards).

Vol. 1986:866]

INCONSISTENCY RULE

idence of government inducement, regardless of whether the defendant
denies the crime, would deter police misconduct. The entrapment defense, however, is not primarily a deterrence measure. 20 3 It exists not to

monitor police behavior but to protect nonpredisposed defendants from
government inducement. 2°4 Thus, allowing inconsistent defenses is not
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the entrapment defense.
Furthermore, the subjective nature of the entrapment defense does
not suggest that it should be available to a federal criminal defendant
who denies the crime. The Supreme Court's subjective formulation of
entrapment does not focus on the degree of police involvement. Rather,

it focuses on the predisposition and intent of the accused. 20 5 A defendant
who has not committed a criminal act with the requisite criminal intent

cannot have been entrapped under federal law. 20 6 In contrast, states that
have adopted an objective test for entrapment allow a defendant to deny

the crime and plead entrapment; 20 7 under an objective test, there is no
203. The Supreme Court has indicated that the purpose of the defense is not to prevent "overzealous law enforcement." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
204. As the Supreme Court has stated:
[E]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it feels to have been 'overzealous law enforcement,' but instead in the notion that Congress could not have intended criminal
punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense but
was induced to commit them by the Government.
Id. at 435.
205. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451. Professor Groot has argued that "[w]henever a criminal defendant has been entrapped, he has been entrapped into doing an act." Groot, supra note 157, at 265.
Groot contends that entrapment is the inducement of prohibited activity, regardless of whether
criminal intent is also created. Id. He concludes that denial of the intent element of the crime thus
is not inconsistent with a claim of entrapment. Id. at 268. This argument ignores the weight of
Supreme Court authority holding that entrapment occurs when government agents implant criminal
intent.
206. By definition, entrapment is the implantation of criminal intent into the mind of a nonpredisposed defendant. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 ("It is only when the Government's deception
actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment
comes into play."); Sorrells,287 U.S. at 442 (entrapment occurs when government implants criminal

design in the mind of an innocent person in order to prosecute). The Sorrells Court reversed the
decision of the court below, which had held that the entrapment defense could be maintained only
where, because of government inducement, "the accused is placed in the attitude of having committed a crime which he did not intend to commit, or where, by reason of the consent implied in the
inducement, no crime has in fact been committed." Id. See also Henderson v. United States, 237
F.2d 169, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1956) ("If the evidence fails to prove by the required standard that the
defendant committed the act charged or had the requisite criminal intent, then, of course, the defense of entrapment is unnecessary.").
207. See, e.g., People v. D'Angelo, 401 Mich. 167, 178, 257 N.W.2d 655, 660 (1977) (objective
test for entrapment does not consider defendant's predisposition but focuses instead on activity of
government agents; admission of the crime not required to raise entrapment); State v. Taylor, 599
P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979) (entrapment defense available even though actor denies commission of
the crime). For a discussion of the objective and subjective tests for entrapment and a list of states
that have adopted the objective approach, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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inconsistency in denying the crime and arguing that the behavior of government agents constituted entrapment. By adhering to the subjective
test for entrapment, the Supreme Court has indicated that denial of the
crime and a plea of entrapment are inconsistent, not alternative,
2 08
defenses.
Other commentators suggest that the inconsistency rule impermissibly forces a defendant to choose between pleading not guilty and pleading entrapment. 20 9 The commentators advancing this argument
erroneously rely on Simmons v. United States.2 10 In Simmons, the
Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be compelled to forgo his
fifth amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination in order
to assert a fourth amendment claim. 2 11 Simmons thus dealt with a
choice between two constitutional rights. The entrapment defense, however, is not founded on constitutional concerns. 2 12 In fact, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the suggestion that the entrapment defense
should be interpreted as a protection of fourth and fifth amendment interests. 213 Thus, Simmons does not prohibit forcing a defendant to
choose between denying the crime and raising entrapment.
Finally, the existence of a due process defense as an alternative to
entrapment ensures that the proposed inconsistency rule will protect the
defendant's constitutional rights. 214 A due process defense is not inconsistent with denial of the crime. The defendant whose constitutional
rights have been violated by government activity does not have to choose
between denying the crime and objecting to the behavior of government
agents. Thus, it is not necessary to allow the defendant who denies the
crime to plead entrapment in order to ensure either protection of the
defendant's constitutional rights or deterrence of egregious government
overreaching. The availability of the due process defense sufficiently
achieves both those goals.

208. The subjective formulation of the entrapment defense assumes an accused "has committed
all the elements of a proscribed offense." Russell, 411 U.S. at 435. Thus, it is impossible for entrapment to have occurred where any element of the crime is absent.
209. See Groot, supra note 157, at 273-74; Note, Pleadingthe Entrapment Defense: The Propriety ofInconsistency, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1025, 1070-72 (1984).
210. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
211. Id. at 393-94.
212. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 (entrapment defense "is not of a constitutional dimension").
213. See id. at 430-31 (rejecting defendant's argument that fourth and fifth amendment concerns
should be considered in entrapment analysis).
214. For a discussion of the due process defense, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Significant disagreement currently exists among the federal courts of
appeals on the issue whether the entrapment defense should be available
to a defendant who does not wish to concede commission of the crime.
This disagreement results in widely varying treatment of the issue: some
jurisdictions require that a defendant affirmatively admit the crime
charged in order to rely on the entrapment defense, while other jursidictions allow a defendant to deny all elements of the crime and plead entrapment. The courts' discussions of this issue reveal confusion about
the nature of the entrapment defense and about the appropriateness of
inconsistent defenses in criminal cases. In the absence of guidance from
Congress or the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the controversy will be
resolved.
This note advances the justifications for prohibiting a defendant
from both denying the crime and pleading entrapment. Such a prohibition is essential to the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial and to
deterring the commission of perjury by criminal defendants. The proposed version of the inconsistency rule fully protects a defendant's right
to rely on the presumption of innocence and requires the government to
prove every element of the case against the defendant. It simply denies
the defendant the opportunity to present two defenses that cannot both
be true.
Karis A. Hastings

